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DARRYL ROBINSON’S MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL LAW: DEONTIC PRINCIPLES DEVELOPED 
THROUGH A COHERENTIST APPROACH 
Milena Sterio* 
“Criminal law is predicated precisely on that personhood and
responsibility; its task is assessing the extent of accused persons’ criminal 
responsibility based on their actions. Criminal law is not employed against 
sharks, or bears, or rocks, or machines; it is premised on the 
acknowledgement of the accused as a responsible human agent who could
have chosen others.”1 
Darryl Robinson’s new book, Justice in Extreme Cases: Criminal Law Theory 
Meets International Criminal Law, presents a compelling argument: that 
international criminal law would benefit from deontic reasoning.2 According to
Robinson, this type of deontic reasoning “requires us to consider the limits of
personal fault and punishability,” and is a “normative reasoning that focuses on our 
duties and obligations to others.”3 Moreover, Robinson argues in this book that
coherentism is the best method for identifying and defining deontic principles.4 
Robinson explains that coherentism is an approach where “[w]e use all of our critical
reasoning tools to test past understandings for bias and inapt assumptions” and
where “we can take common formulations of fundamental principles as starting
hypotheses, then continue to test and refine them.”5 The advantage of coherentism,
according to Robinson, is that it allows us to work with all available clues in order 
to solve problems of the middle range and to develop “mid-level principles,” which
we can test to analyze whether they are normatively correct or analytically useful, 
and which we can then use to reform our practice.6 In order to develop his argument,
Robinson uses command responsibility as an example; he posits that under the 
deontic reasoning model, command responsibility should be recognized in 
international criminal law as a mode of accessory liability.7 Robinson thus proposes
a novel way of analyzing command responsibility—through the lens of deontic 
* The Charles R. Emrick Jr. – Calfee Halter & Griswold Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall 
College of Law. 
1 .  DARRYL ROBINSON, JUSTICE IN EXTREME CASES: CRIMINAL LAW THEORY MEETS
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 69 (2020). 
2. Id. at 10. 
3. Id. at 11. 
4. Id. at 230. 
5. Id. at 14. 
6. Id.
7. Id. at 15. 
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6 TEMPLE INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. [35.1 
principles developed by using a coherentist model.8 Robinson’s book is a significant 
contribution to existing literature within the field of international criminal law 
because of both its general analysis regarding how the field should continue to
develop, and also in light of its more pointed analysis regarding command
responsibility. 
Robinson develops his argument carefully and methodically. In order to explain
why deontic reasoning is necessary within the field of international criminal law, he
criticizes other approaches and argues that they are often inadequately transplanted
into international criminal law.9 
For example, Robinson suggests that principles derived from international
humanitarian law and human rights law may have been too casually embedded in
the jurisprudence and scholarly analysis of international criminal law.10 According
to Robinson, “part of the problem lies in habits of reasoning and argumentation that
were transplanted from human rights and humanitarian law without adequate 
recognition that the new context – criminal law – requires different thinking.”11 This
has resulted in “some contradictory assumptions and methods of reasoning” within
international criminal law.12 Robinson illustrates this point by explaining that liberal 
principles embedded in human rights law seek to protect the individual from the
state.13 In criminal law, and in international criminal law, “it is now we who are 
wielding power over individuals, and thus the liberal principles now engage to
restrain us.” 14 Thus, although human rights law can provide guidance to
international criminal law, it would be imprudent to develop the latter by simply
importing principles from the former. 15 Similarly, Robinson cautions against
superimposing international humanitarian law principles within international
criminal law, because the former are focused on developing better systems, whereas
the latter is concerned with imposing individual criminal liability. 16  Robinson 
endeavors to correct this through the imposition of deontic restraints, developed by
using a coherentist model.17 Robinson’s model allows for the borrowing of human 
rights and international humanitarian law principles by those working in
international criminal law, so long as deontic constraints impose appropriate
limitations on such borrowing practices.18 
Moreover, Robinson pushes back against victim-focused teleological reasoning
in international criminal law.19 This type of teleological reasoning is reductive, 
8. Id. at 13–15. 
9. Id. at 20. 
10. Id.
11. Id. at 22 (original italics omitted). 
12. Id.
13. Id. at 25. 
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 39. 
17. See id. at 12–14 (introducing the five central elements of his methodological framework). 
18. See id. at 7–9 (explaining that deontic constraints are important for developing international 
criminal law because they promote respect for individuals).
19. See id. at 27–31 (objecting not to teleological reasoning per se, but to the reductive and
 
 













   
   
   
 
 
    




   
 
   
 














 7 2021] DARRYL ROBINSON’S MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
according to Robinson, because it assumes that international criminal law only has
one single purpose—maximizing victim protection. 20 In addition, this type of 
teleological reasoning “is ‘aggressive’ because it uses that (presumed) single
purpose to override other tools of construction, such as the text and context.”21 
Robinson accepts that teleological reasoning is an important and appropriate part of 
legal reasoning; he warns, however, against using such reductive and aggressive 
forms of teleological reasoning, as these can lead toward over-simplistic and 
problematic tribunal judgments and inappropriate development of the field of
international criminal law. 22 Robinson also cautions against the use of victim-
focused teleological reasoning in international criminal law because such reasoning 
is often embedded with utopian aspirations.23 For example, international criminal 
law, if driven by victim-focused teleological reasoning, may embrace overly 
ambitious goals to end, as opposed to manage or reduce, crime.24 “Admirable, but
utopian, objectives such as eliminating crimes, which no criminal law system can 
achieve, are likely to generate calls for ever harsher rules and thus promote a
tendency away from principled restraints.” 25 Thus, according to Robinson, 
international criminal law driven by purely victim-centric teleological reasoning 
may develop in unwarranted and normatively unsound directions.26 
Robinson is equally skeptical of using national criminal law principles in 
international criminal law.27 He agrees with other scholars, such as Mark Drumbl
and Mark Osiel, that ordinary criminal law principles may not be applicable in the 
context of international crimes.28 Robinson, however, argues that although we may 
discard such domestic criminal law principles in light of the special context of
international criminal law, we should not “discard our underlying deontic
commitment to our fellow human beings.”29 
In addition to explaining why existing approaches to international criminal law 
may be inadequate or incomplete, Robinson argues that legal reasoning is equally 
important as legal conclusions. 30 According to Robinson, we must pay careful
attention to our legal reasoning because faulty reasoning may eventually produce 
faulty outcomes and judgments (“[o]ur reasoning is our ‘math,’ and systemic 
distortions in our math will eventually throw off our calculations in significant
ways.”).31 Thus, Robinson’s proposal—applying deontic reasoning to the field of 
international criminal law—is one based on humanity and “respect for the moral 
aggressive form of teleological reasoning in international criminal law analyses). 
20. Id. at 29. 
21. Id.
22. Id. at 31. 
23. Id. at 36–39. 
24. Id. at 36. 
25. Id. at 37. 
26. Id. at 38. 
27. Id. at 70–71. 
28. Id. at 70, 72–73. 
29. Id. at 62. 




   
  
 
   
  
  







      
 
























8 TEMPLE INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. [35.1 
agency of individuals.”32 In addition, Robinson’s proposal is based on compassion
and empathy; Robinson views the latter as a “kernel of justice.”33 Robinson argues
that the adoption of this approach will result in a “more careful liberal account: a 
humanistic, open-minded (or reconstructive), cosmopolitan, and coherentist
account.”34 
In order to illustrate his argument, Robinson engages in a comprehensive 
analysis of command responsibility.35 Robinson analyzes and criticizes different
ways in which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)
has characterized command responsibility. It has, for example, conceived of
command responsibility as a separate or sui generis offense and has rejected the
causal contribution requirement. 36 Robinson argues that the “confusion” and
“fragmentation” in the Tribunal jurisprudence has resulted from an unresolved 
contradiction: a failure to comply with the culpability principle.37 The culpability
principle is fundamental to a vision of international criminal justice based on
humanity, and thus constrained by deontic principles.38 International criminal law 
which imposes punishment on individuals who are not truly culpable is another
vision driven by other, non-humanity based purposes; Robinson would argue that
this vision of international criminal law is inadequate, unjust, and unnecessary.39 
In order to “untangle” command responsibility and to align it with the principle 
of culpability, Robinson proposes that command responsibility ought to be
recognized as a mode of accessory liability, “as it was in World War II jurisprudence, 
in [some] early [Yugoslavia] Tribunal jurisprudence, and in the [International
Criminal Court (ICC)] Statute.” 40 In addition, Robinson argues that the 
commander’s dereliction of duty must at the very least have a causal effect on the
troops’ own wrongdoing—the commander must “encourage,” “facilitate,” or 
somehow “have an effect on subordinate crimes.”41 Imposing responsibility on a 
commander whose behavior did not have a causal effect on the subordinates’ 
behavior and did not in some manner contribute to the commission of the crimes
would go against the principle of culpability.42 Robinson also argues that the “should 
have known” mens rea standard, present in the ICC Statute but neglected or
misapplied in some ICTY cases, is appropriate and justified by deontic reasoning 
32. Id. at 62. 
33. Id. at 67. 
34. Id. at 62. 
35. See generally id. at 194–222. 
36. Id. at 169–70. 
37. See id. at 143–76 (applying a coherentist method of deontic principles to expose the
Tribunal’s failure to consistently apply the culpability principle).
38. See id. at 162–63 (arguing that respect for culpability principles requires engagement with 
deontic arguments). 
39. See id. at 173–74 (providing a serial list of arguments that establish the need for more 
debate on this issue). 
40. Id. at 15, 194. 
41. Id. at 15, 145. 









   
  
 
   
 
  
   
  
    








   
  
 
   
   
 







    
 
    
 
 
 9 2021] DARRYL ROBINSON’S MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
and standards. 43 According to Robinson, the “should have known” standard
 
adequately imposes responsibility on commanders who knew of subordinates’ 

wrongdoing, and also on those who purposefully chose not to know.44 This standard: 

does not exculpate where the commander has created her own ignorance,
 
through a criminal dereliction of the duty of vigilance entrusted to her to 

guard against precisely this danger. Culpability-based rationales of
 
causation and equivalence apply to the commander who, contrary to this
duty, buries her head in the sand.45 
Finally, Robinson posits that a commander, charged with command responsibility
as a form of accessory liability, need not have the same mens rea as the principal 
perpetrators (her subordinates).46 Robinson convincingly argues that roles matter,
and that command responsibility, as a mode of accessory liability, needs to
appropriately take into account the distinction between principals and accessories in
its imposition of different mens rea standards on the former versus the latter.47 
Robinson further illustrates his argument regarding command responsibility in 
one of the book’s annexes, where he discusses in detail the ICC’s Bemba decision.48 
By analyzing the reasoning and conclusions of the Bemba Pre-Trial, Trial, and 
Appellate Chambers, Robinson provides the reader with an additional opportunity
to understand how deontic reasoning may be applied in an international criminal
tribunal’s jurisprudence. Robinson concludes that the Bemba Pre-Trial and Trial
Chambers correctly applied deontic reasoning through a coherentist method;49 this
observation may be one of the greatest affirmations that Robinson is correct in his
view of international criminal law, because his view coincides with the views of 
highly distinguished ICC judges (it is also possible that the ICC judges have read
Robinson’s prior work and are influenced by his thought processes and legal
analysis). 
In sum, Robinson develops a model of command responsibility guided by
deontic principles and constraints, by using a coherentist approach.50 Command 
responsibility, according to Robinson’s model, is a form of accessory liability which 
embraces the concept of criminal negligence, a positive duty for the commander to 
inquire into subordinates’ ongoing behavior, a rejection of the standard of actual
possession of information for the commander, and the adoption of the “should have
known” standard in its place.51 
Robinson concludes his impressive argument with a return to a defense of
43. Id. at 15–16. 
44. Id. at 203–05. 
45. Id. at 216. 
46. Id. at 15. 
47. Id. at 212–13. 
48 . See id. at 257–71 (discussing ICC’s Pre-Trial, Trial, and Appellate Chambers in
Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08A, Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba
Gombo Against Trial Chamber III’s “Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute,” (June 8,
2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_02984.pdf). 
49. ROBINSON, supra note 1, at 271. 
50. Id. at 257–71. 







   
  
 













   
  
 
    
   
    
  
 














10 TEMPLE INT’L & COMPAR. L.J. [35.1 
deontic principles and a coherentist approach as a general matter. He argues that
deontic analysis of international criminal law is necessary if one embraces
international criminal justice through the lens of humanity. 52  Unlike source­
based/doctrinal and teleological/purpose-driven analysis, “[d]eontic analysis
directly considers the principled limits of institutional punishment in light of the 
personhood, dignity, and agency of human beings affected by the system.” 53 
Robinson believes that coherentism is the most appropriate method for identifying 
these important deontic principles.54 Because we do not have at our disposal an 
“uncontroverted and reliable foundational ethical theory,”55 we should resort to 
coherentism, because this approach enables us to set aside the search for “certainty”
and for “ultimate foundations” and to instead draw on all available clues to develop 
mid-level principles which will ultimately lead toward appropriate normative 
beliefs.56 
Robinson’s argument is elegant, compelling, and realist. First, Robinson
develops a tremendously insightful argument about the appropriate reasoning and 
constraining principles that ought to be imposed on the field of international criminal
law; he does so in a logical and seemingly simple manner, which contributes toward
the overall elegance of his argument. Robinson’s book flows, from the introduction,
through more theoretical reasoning and the practical example of command
responsibility, to the general conclusion regarding the necessity of deontic reasoning 
in international criminal law, and to the lengthy and additionally convincing
annexes. Robinson’s clear and concise writing style contributes additionally to the
general gracefulness of his argument. Second, Robinson’s reasoning and conclusion
are compelling. To many readers, it will appear natural and necessary to adopt a
humanity-based approach to international criminal justice. When he writes that
criminal law is not employed against non-humans, such as sharks, bears, rocks, and 
machines, but against the accused who is a responsible moral agent, Robinson
conveys a powerful and convincing message that humanity-based principles need to
ground international criminal law.57 Finally, Robinson’s arguments are realist—he
recognizes that human research and reasoning are imperfect and thus advocates for
the development of mid-level principles upon the consideration of all available 
clues.58 Robinson is in favor of humanity while recognizing its limitations and
inherent flaws; thus, his model for international criminal justice is based on the 
former but developed through a realist approach that takes into account the latter.59 
Robinson’s book is an enormous contribution to the field of international criminal
law. It is likely that Robinson will continue to influence the ICC and other 
international criminal tribunals and that his work will shape the future jurisprudence 
of such tribunals. 
52. Id. at 229. 
53. Id. See generally id. at 11–12. 
54. Id. at 230. 
55. Id.
56. See id., glossary at 282 (defining coherentism using the quoted terms). 
